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Abstract
Uncoordinated frequency hopping (UFH) has recently emerged as an eective mecha-
nism to defend against jamming attacks. Existing research focuses on the optimal design of
the hopping pattern, which implicitly assumes that the strategy of the attacker is xed. In
practice, the attacker might adjust its strategy to maximize its damage on the communi-
cation system. In this thesis, we study the design of optimal hopping pattern (the defense
strategy) as long as the optimal jamming pattern (the attack strategy). In particular, we
model the dynamic between the legitimate users and the attacker as a zero sum game, and
study the property of this game. We show that when the legitimate users and the jammer
can access only one channel at any time, the game has a unique Nash equilibrium. In the
Nash equilibrium, the legitimate users and Eve will access or jam only a subset of channels
that have good channel quality. Furthermore, the better the channel, the larger the prob-
ability that Eve will jam the channel and the smaller the probability the legitimate users
will access this channel. We further extend the study to multiple access multiple jamming
case and characterize the Nash equilibrium. We also give numerical results to illustrate the
analytical results derived in this thesis.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter, we rst introduce the concept, consequences and categories of jamming
attacks in Section 1.1. The conventional anti-jamming method is introduced in Section 1.2.
The concept of uncoordinated frequency hopping (UFH) is introduced in Section 1.3. The
related work about UFH is shown and discussed in Section 1.4. In Section 1.5, we summarize
the main contributions of this thesis.
1.1 Jamming
Wireless technology is becoming more and more popular [1] and is widely used by com-
panies and individuals for important communications, such as mobile e-commerce transac-
tions, email, and corporate data transmissions [2]. As the result, security issues become
more and more important for wireless networks. This is not a trivial problem because wire-
less devices, including smart cellular phones and personal digital assistants (PDAs) with
Internet access, were not originally designed with security as a top priority [2].
Most of wireless network security problems can be mitigated or fully addressed by chang-
ing wireless network security architectures or using more advanced cryptographic meth-
ods [3]. However, there are still some threats that can not be addressed by these methods.
Jamming is an important class of such threats [3].
Due to the openness of the wireless medium, attackers can easily implement jamming
attacks to inject signals into the medium. Attackers can easily observe communications be-
2tween legitimate users, and then make the transmission in wireless networks fail by injecting
false messages. The attackers can implement dierent kinds of jamming attacks [4]:
1. Constant jammer: The constant jammer continually emits a radio signal.
2. Deceptive jammer: The deceptive jammer constantly injects regular packets to the
channel. So legitimate users will be deceived into believing the jammer is also a
legitimate user in transmitting state.
3. Random jammer: The random jammer alternates between sleeping and jamming.
4. Reactive jammer: The reactive jammer only begins jamming when the jamming de-
tects activity in the channel.
Reactive jamming is the most important threat among the four jammers [5]. The reason
is that, while destroying the packets, the attacker minimizes its risk of being detected [5]. In
frequency hopping, reactive jammer cannot complete the detection process if the hopping
rate is high enough [6]. So it is can be seen that to mitigate jamming, the spread spectrum
techniques are usually adopted [7].
1.2 Spread Spectrum Techniques
Spread spectrum techniques are conventional anti-jamming methods [8]. The spread
spectrum signals usually have the characteristic that the bandwidth is much larger than
the information rate which can be seen as redundancy. This kind of redundancy is added
to the signal due to the signal is required to overcome severe interference in the process
of transmission in the channel. The redundancy of the spread spectrum signal can be
characterize by bandwidth expansion factor which is usually much larger than one [7]. To
introduce redundancy to signal, we know that coding is an ecient method [7]. So how to
code the signal to make it spread spectrum is the rst key element in designing the spread
spectrum systems [7].
In the security aspect, in order to avoid the attacker to demodulate the spread spectrum
signals, pseudorandomness is needed [7]. The pseudorandomness of the spread spectrum
3signals makes the signals seem to be random noise to the attacker thus making it very
dicult for the attacker to demodulate the signals [7]. This characteristic is actually related
to the purpose or application of these spread spectrum signals [7].
In [7], the authors list the main purposes of the spread spectrum signals:
1. To combat the eects of interference due to jamming, interference caused by other
users of the channel and self-interference due to multipath propagation.
2. To hide a signal by transmitting it at low power, thus making it dicult for an attacker
to detect the signal in the presence of background noise.
3. To achieve message privacy in the presence of attackers.
4. To obtain accurate range (time delay) and range rate (velocity) measurements in radar
and navigation (this purpose is not directly related to communications).
In combating the eects of interference of intentional jamming, the knowledge of the jammer
is important [7]. If the jammer knows the characteristic of the transmitting signal, it is
easy for the jammer to mimic this signal transmitted by the transmitter and confuse the
receiver [7]. To prevent this to happen, the transmitter introduces the randomness (actually
pseudorandomness) to the signal which is unpredictable for the jammer while known to the
receiver. So the only way for the jammer to do jamming is to transmit an interfering signal
without any prior knowledge about the pseudorandom pattern [7].
Frequency-hopping spread spectrum (FHSS), direct-sequence spread spectrum (DSSS),
time-hopping spread spectrum (THSS), chirp spread spectrum (CSS), and combinations of
these techniques are forms of spread spectrum [7]. Each of these techniques employs pseu-
dorandom number sequences created using pseudorandom number generators to determine
and control the spreading pattern of the signal across the allocated bandwidth [7].
Figure 1.1 shows the traditional frequency hopping (FH) which relies on secrets shared
between the transmitter and receiver. The shared secret then determines the hopping
pattern in FH. A third party who does not know the secret codes cannot predict the trans-
mission [9]. Then the probability of the transmission being jammed is reduced [9]. But the
prerequisite is a secret must be shared by the transmitter and the receiver [9].
4Figure 1.1: Frequency hopping.
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Figure 1.2: Model of spread spectrum system.
5Figure 1.2 shows the model of spread spectrum. Notice that we should have two identical
pseudorandom pattern generators, one at each side. In practice, we require the transmitter
and receiver have the same pattern and we should have the pseudorandom pattern gen-
erator perfectly synchronized [7]. The problem arises that if two nodes which have not
communicated before but want to communicate in the presence of jammer, the pseudoran-
dom pattern cannot be known by the other side [9]. If we want the pattern to be pre-stored
in each node in the network, scalability is a big issue [9]. If the network has N nodes, then
for each of them to communicate with other nodes, N   1 pairs of pre-shared secrets are
needed for each node. The total number of pre-shared secrets in this network is N(N 1)2 . If
N is large, it is challenging to pre-distribute and further store N 1 pairs of secrets for each
node. In this context, the uncoordinated frequency hopping discussed below is proposed
in [9] to solve this problem.
1.3 Uncoordinated Frequency Hopping(UFH)
The uncoordinated frequency hopping (UFH) to solve the problem described above is
originally proposed in [9], which can break the circular dependence of conventional spread
spectrum methods.
Figure 1.3 describes the circular dependence problem. In particular, if two devices do
not share any secret keys or codes and want to execute a key establishment protocol in the
presence of a jammer, they have to use a jamming-resistant communication [9]. However,
known anti-jamming techniques such as frequency hopping and direct-sequence spread spec-
trum rely on secret (spreading) codes that are shared between the communication partners
prior to the start of their communication [9]. This creates the circular dependence.
Figure 1.4 illustrates the high level idea of UFH. In UFH, the transmitter and receiver
hop randomly between channels in an uncoordinated manner. The transmission is successful
when they are in the same channel and the jammer is not in that channel. Figure 1.4 shows
3 dierent scenarios of UFH:
1. In timeslot 1, both transmitter and receiver are in channel 5, while Eve is not in
channel 5. The transmission is successful.
6Key 
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in the 
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Figure 1.3: Circular dependence.
Figure 1.4: Uncoordinated frequency hopping.
72. In timeslot 2, the transmitter and receiver are not in the same channel. The trans-
mission is failed.
3. In timeslot 3, both transmitter and receiver are in channel 3, while Eve is also in
channel 3. This transmission is jammed, so it is failed.
Thus UFH breaks the circular dependence by not relying on the hopping pattern [9]
and by establishing a secret key when the transmission is successful. In [9], it is shown that
UFH scheme can be as resistant to jamming as coordinated frequency hopping. The authors
assume the legitimate communication nodes have the ability to store a few megabytes of
data and can perform elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) based public key cryptography.
The attacker in this model is computationally bounded and also energy constrained. The
goal of the attacker is to interfere the communication of the legitimate nodes by inserting
messages, modifying messages or jamming messages. In their scheme, a message M which
is going to be sent by transmitter is split into l fragmentsM1, M2,..., Ml. And the behavior
of transmitting fragment Mj does not relate to any channel and does not relate to the
fragments sent before. The authors call this scheme randomized. At the receiver side,
the fragments of message M should be reassembled. This process is to avoid the jamming
attack. In this paper, the authors assume that the receiver switches channel less often than
the transmitter, thus reducing the number of partially received fragments. The scheme
of avoiding inserting messages and modifying messages is also designed using Hash link.
For each fragment Mi, some additional messages are added to Mi to form a packet mi =
idjijMijh(mi+1). id is the message identier, i is the fragment number, Mi is the fragment
of the message, and h(mi+1) is the hash value of the next packet. For the last packet,
ml = idjljMljh(M1), so it forms an unbreakable hash link in the fragments of messages.
This ensures the attacker cannot perform eective inserting or modifying attack. The
hash-linked packets are transmitted with a high number of repetition. The transmission is
successful when the transmitter receives the reply that the reassembling is successful and
then the transmission is nished. The transmission can also be nished unsuccessfully with
the number of repetitions has exceeded an threshold value. When the packets are received,
the receiver starts to compute the packets into a whole message. First, the receiver link the
8packets according to the fragment number. Second, the receiver computes the hash value
of the i + 1th packet h(mi+1) and compares it with the hash value part in the previous
packet. When all the packets are linked successfully, the receiver sends the reply message.
For the security analysis, given two consecutive packets mi 1 = idji   1jMi 1jh(mi) and
mi = idjijMijh(mi+1) where 2 < i < l, the attacker need to forge a m0i. So the attacker
needs to nd hi = h(idjijMijhi+1) = h(idjijM 0i jh
0
i+1). But this means to nd a collision of
hash function h(), so this is impossible for the computationally bounded attacker to nd a
collision of hash function. The process that last packet in chain linking to the rst packet
avoids inserting additional chain heads. The attacker needs to forge a m
0
1 = idj1jM
0
1jh2 for
m1 = idj1jM1jh2. So h(M1) = h(M 01), which also means nding a collision for h(). This
UFH scheme for key establishment works like this: rst, the transmitter and receiver use
a key establishment protocol to generate a key and use the UFH scheme to communicate
to agree on a key; second, the transmitter and receiver use this key to nd the hopping
sequence. In this model, the authors show that for all attacker types, jamming is the best
strategy for the attacker. The authors also state that there is no prior work that focuses
on circular dependence of anti-jamming establishment and they have not been able to nd
a scheme to transfer arbitrary length messages without a pre-shared key.
Comparing to FH, UFH does not need shared secrets and synchronization. However,
UFH suers from low throughput [6], as the transmitter and receiver are uncoordinated
and hence most of them they are operating at the same channel.
1.4 Existing Schemes to Improve Eciency
As discussed above, since the hopping in UFH is uncoordinated, UFH often achieves a
low eciency [6]. To alleviate this problem, there have been some recent works attempting
to increase the throughput of UFH. They mainly focus on two aspects: learning based
approach and cooperative broadcasting approach, which will be discussed in Section 1.4.1
and Section 1.4.2 respectively. Section 1.4.3 will discuss some other research related to
UFH.
91.4.1 Learing Based Approach
In [6], the authors develop an almost optimal and adaptive UFH-based anti-jamming
scheme and give the thorough quantitative performance analysis for this type of schemes.
The UFH-based anti-jamming communication is formulated as a non-stochastic Multi-
armed Bandit Problem and online adaptive UFH algorithm against oblivious and adaptive
jammer is proposed. The authors show that the performance dierence between their algo-
rithm and the optimal one is no more than O(kr
p
Tn lnn) in T timeslots, where kr is the
number of frequencies the receiver can receive simultaneously and n is the total number of
orthogonal frequencies. A thorough quantitative performance under various strategies of
the sender, the receiver and the jammer is made. The authors also analyze the parameter
selection to achieve the optimality. In the model of this paper, each node can transmit and
receive over ks and kr channels respectively, where ks  n and kr  n. It is also assumed
that the three parties, i.e., the transmitter, the receiver and the jammer have no prior
knowledge of others' strategy. The authors do not consider message authentication and
privacy in this model because this can be achieved on the application layer. The authors
assume the jammer can jam kj channels in one timeslot. The authors divide the jammers
into two categories: oblivious jammer and adaptive jammer. The oblivious jammer selects
the jamming strategy independent of the past channel status he has observed. The adaptive
jammer can adaptively change his jamming strategy based on his past experiences and ob-
servations. In this paper, the authors do not assume the channel quality can be estimated
and known before or during transmission. So the algorithm proposed is trying to do online
learning the strategy of jammer and use the strategy of jammer to achieve optimality.
In [10], the authors consider power control jointly with UFH problem. The proposed
approach in this paper utilizes online learning theory to determine both the hopping chan-
nels and the transmitting powers based on the history of channel status. The sender in this
model has a power limited budget. Using the proposed approach, the transmitter can choose
both transmission power of each channel and which channel to transmit simultaneously.
In [11], the authors discuss primary user emulation (PUE) attack to ght over channels
with the secondary user in cognitive radio systems. In this scenario, there are two parties
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instead of three parties in the UFH model. The authors model the PUE and random hopping
as a zerosum game between the attacker and secondary user. The Nash equilibrium of this
model is found. One important assumption here is that the channel statistics are known.
In this paper, available probability of each channel is known.
In [12], the authors change known channel statistics model into unknown channel statis-
tics model. In this model, the secondary users need to face the challenge that how to
address the uncertainties in the channel statistics and the attacker's policy. The authors
adopt adversarial bandit algorithm which is signicantly modied in the context of blind
dogght in spectrum. This is actually a way to learn the optimal defense strategy using
past experience and adaptively change the strategy to the channel dynamics and attack
strategy. This key idea is similar as [6] which focuses on a dierent problem.
The learning based approach implicitly assumes that the strategy of the jammer is xed.
What if the attacker is also intelligent so that the attacker can implement learning method
to learn the strategy of the legitimate users and adjust its own strategy? For intelligent
attackers, we can not use learning based approach and optimize the throughput using the
learned strategy of the attacker since the strategy of the jammer is no longer xed. This
motivates us to think about the UFH problem with intelligent jammers.
1.4.2 Cooperative Broadcasting Approach
In [13], [14], [15], [16], [17] , [18] and [19], a collaborative UFH-based broadcast (CUB)
scheme to achieve a higher communication eciency is proposed and the main idea is to
allow nodes that already receive the message to help broadcast. The authors show that their
CUB scheme can achieve higher communication eciency and is more resistant to jamming
attack than existing jamming resistant broadcast scheme. In this paper, the authors assume
a source node intends to transmit a message to N nodes. The analysis is mainly focused
on single hop. The message is split into M fragments of equal length, and each of them
is transmitted during one time slot (frequency hop). The CUB scheme is an extension
of previous pair-wise UFH schemes. The authors name the straightforward extension of
UFH in the broadcast scenario without cooperation as UFH-based Broadcast (NUB). In
NUB, each node selects one of C channels in each time slot to receive a packet, and repeat
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this until the whole broadcast message is received. NUB does not have relay nodes in the
broadcast process and in this paper it is shown that NUB takes longer time than pairwise
transmission to a single receiver. The authors mainly focus on jamming attack and assume
the computation and transmission capability of the attacker is bounded. The time slot
is tp, and the jamming attack needs tp to successfully jam a packet, and it takes ts time
to sense a channel. The authors categorize the jamming attacks into responsive attacks
and nonresponsive attacks, based on whether the jammer senses the transmission before
implementing jamming attacks. For responsive attacks, it is assumed that CJ channels can
be blocked simultaneously and tJ time is needed to switch those channels. In one time slot,
the number of channels can be jammed is nJCJ and nJ =
tp
tp+tJ
. For nonresponsive attacks,
it is assumed that Cs channels can be sensed simultaneously. In one time slot, the number
of channels can be sensed is nsCs and ns =
tp tp tJ
ts
. The authors assume the attacker can
implement responsive and nonresponsive attacks simultaneously, which is a worst case, and
they call it responsive-sweep strategy. In this worst case, the attacker can jam nsCs+nJCJ
channels in one time slot, and each time slot is jammed with probability nsCs+nJCJC . The
authors propose three relay channel selection strategies: Random Relay Channel selection
(RRC), Sweep Relay Channel selection (SwRC), and Static Relay Channel selection (StRC).
In RRC, each relay node selects randomly and independently one channel in all C channels
to transmit a packet. But RRC often results in collision, which is two relay nodes select one
same channel. SwRC is an idealized version of RRC. In SwRC, the rst node selects one
channel in all C channels, and the second node selects one channel in the left C 1 channels
and so on. SwRC avoids collision but it requires a lot of information exchange between relay
nodes. In StRC, the selection of channels is no longer random, the channels in broadcast
process is xed and nonoverlapping. The authors assume the nodes have unique IDs and a
suitable algorithm can make the probability of channel collision is negligible. The authors
mainly adopt a Random Receiving Channel Selection (RRxC) scheme which means the
receiver hops randomly among the C channels. Specially, for StRC, the authors design an
Adaptive Receiving Channel selection (ARxC) strategy. As the StRC, each node in ARxC
is assumed to know the relay channel list. If all the relay channels in the channel list are
jammed, the strategy is switched to RRxC. In CUB, the authors design the control scheme of
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transmission duration, the transmitter (source node or relay node) stops transmitting when
a ACK signal is received or a maximum transmission duration is reached. The authors
also analyze the cooperation gain of RRC and StRC strategy. Simulations also indicate a
signicant improvement of performance of CUB compared to noncollaborative UFH-based
broadcast scheme.
[20] investigates ecient Media Access Control (MAC) strategies for the UFH-based
collaborative broadcast. To minimize the broadcast delay and to signicantly reduce energy
cost, the closed-form expression of channel access probabilities is given. This paper is based
on [14]. The authors mainly consider two issues: broadcast delay and total energy cost. The
authors divide the synchronization among the relays and source into two categories. The
rst category is perfect synchronization relays, all transmitters are synchronized both in
time and transmission content. The second category is asynchronous relays, which is more
realistic one, where two or more transmission over the same channel fail. The broadcast
delay is the time from the beginning of the transmission to the message is successfully
received by the receiver. The energy consumption is all the energy consumed in this process.
The authors give the minimal delay strategy and energy ecient strategy. The authors show
that if broadcast delay is the main concern, the relays should aggressively access the wireless
media. As the network grows, to reduce energy consumption, the channel access probability
should be gradually reduced.
[21] addresses the problem of anti-jamming broadcast communication among nodes
that do not share secret keys. This paper is based on [9]. Three instances of Uncoordi-
nated Spread Spectrum (USS) are presented: Uncoordinated Frequency Hopping (UFH),
Uncoordinated DSSS (UDSSS) and hybrid UFH-UDSSS. UFH randomizes the selection of
the frequency channels and UDSSS randomizes the selection of the spreading codes. The
feasibility and practicability of the schemes proposed was demonstrated by a USRP/GNU
Radio based prototype implementation.
Cooperative broadcasting approach does not focus on improving the throughput of one
hop in UFH. If the throughput of one hop can be increased by choosing appropriate strategy,
the total throughput of cooperative broadcasting can be increased automatically. As the
result, we mainly focus on optimizing the throughput of one hop in UFH.
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1.4.3 Other Research about UFH
In [22], the authors propose a new USD-FH scheme for Die-Hellman (DH) key estab-
lishment using UFH before the FH communication starts. This is based on [9], and tries to
design a more ecient scheme. The advantage of this scheme over others is that it does have
to split the DH message into multiple packets. The basic idea of USD-FH is to transmit
each DH key establishment message using a one time pseudorandom hopping pattern, and
before the actual message transmission, the seed of the pseudorandom pattern is disclosed.
For energy bounded jammer, it is very dicult to jam all the channels, so there is always a
chance that the receiver gets the seed of the pseudorandom hopping pattern while the jam-
mer does not. Since the jammer cannot jam the message transmitted using pseudorandom
hopping pattern, so the receiver can receive the DH message correctly. This paper uses
UFH to establish key before FH communication.
[23] mainly talks about the coordination between a secondary transmitter and a sec-
ondary receiver in order to use the same spectrum white space. This is similar to the
synchronization between the transmitter and receiver in UFH. The authors build a new
transmission scheme within a framework of frequency-hopping spread spectrum (FHSS)
transmission with M-ary frequency-shift keying (M-FSK) modulation. When the white
space detection error is large, which happens more often during the beginning stage of the
secondary user transmission, the spreading gain is increased to reduce the interference to
the primary user. When the white space error detection is small enough, which happens
more often after beginning stage of transmission, the white space in spectrum is known, the
spreading gain is decreased to increase the data rate of the secondary users. The purpose
of using FHSS is to avoid interference and to improve security.
In [24], the authors propose an approximation for the channel capacity of M-frequency
T-user multiple access channel.
In [25], the authors propose a detection scheme for uncoordinated narrow-band FH
systems. The detection scheme can detect the existence and the number of the narrow-
band signals colliding with the desired signal.
These papers are mainly focus on designing the UFH scheme in dierent specic scenar-
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ios. In this thesis, the original model proposed in [9] is used which will lead to more general
results.
1.5 Summary of Thesis
In this thesis, the goal is to optimize the throughput of UFH assuming that the
attacker is intelligent. Since the jammer is intelligent, it will also adapt its attack
strategy. Hence, when we design our optimal hopping strategy, we need to take the dynamics
of the attacker into consideration. In this thesis, we model the interaction of the legitimate
users and the jammer in UFH as a zero-sum game, and study the optimal hopping strategy
of the legitimate users and correspondingly the optimal attack strategy of the jammer using
game theory [26]. In this thesis, we use the name \Alice" to denote the transmitter, \Bob"
to denote the receiver and \Eve" to denote the jammer.
The organization and main contributions of the thesis are the following:
 In Chapter 2, the background of the zero-sum game and the Nash equilibrium are
introduced.
 In Chapter 3, the zero-sum game model of UFH is introduced. The strategies of the
transmitter, the receiver and the attacker are dened. The denition of the Nash
equilibrium of our game is also given.
 In Chapter 4, we study the case that all the channels have the same capacity. We
fully characterize the Nash equilibrium for this case. In the Nash equilibrium, Alice,
Bob and Eve always operate on the same set of channels. We show that Alice, Bob
and Eve always access or jam all channels. Alice, Bob and Eve access or jam each
channel with an equal probability. The average throughput is a decreasing function
of N for N  2, where N is the total number of channels.
 In Chapter 5, we study the general channel quality case with R1  R2  :::  RN ,
where N is the total number of channels. We fully characterize the Nash equilibrium
for this case. In the Nash equilibrium, Alice, Bob and Eve always operate on the
same set of channels. Alice, Bob and Eve do not always access or jam all channels.
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A new variable k is introduced and it is for Alice, Bob and Eve to decide on which
channels they should take actions. k separates \good" channels and \bad" channels.
Alice, Bob and Eve have no motivation to access or jam channels from 1 to k   1.
When the channel quality is better, Eve jams this channel with a larger probability
while Alice and Bob access this channel with a smaller probability. It is simple to
verify that N   k + 1  2. This implies that Alice and Bob will access at least two
channels. Otherwise, if they access only one channel, this channel will be jammed by
the attacker with probability 1.
 In Chapter 6, we extend the model into one access multiple jamming case, in which
case Alice and Bob can access one channel in one timeslot, while Eve can jam multiple
channels in one timeslot. We fully characterize the Nash equilibrium for this case. In
the Nash equilibrium, Alice, Bob and Eve always operate on the same set of channels.
Alice, Bob and Eve do not always access or jam all channels. k is a variable that is for
Alice, Bob and Eve to decide on which channels they should take actions. k separates
\good" channels and \bad" channels. Alice, Bob and Eve have no motivation to access
or jam channels from 1 to k   1. k is determined by the channel capacity and Mj ,
and it is not related to Alice and Bob. When the channel quality is better, Eve jams
this channel with a larger probability while Alice and Bob access this channel with a
smaller probability. It is simple to verify that N   k + 1  Mj + 1, and Mj is the
number of channels Eve can jam in one timeslot. This implies that Alice and Bob
will access at least Mj + 1 channels. Otherwise, if they access only Mj channels, this
channel will be jammed by the attacker with probability 1.
 In Chapter 7, we extend the model into multiple access one jamming case, in which
case Alice and Bob can access multiple channels in one timeslot, while Eve can jam
one channels in one timeslot. In the Nash equilibrium, Alice, Bob and Eve do not
always operate on the same set of channels. k is a variable that is for Alice, Bob
and Eve to decide on which channels they should take actions. k separates \good"
channels and \bad" channels. Alice, Bob and Eve have no motivation to access or jam
channels from 1 to k   1. But in some cases, Alice and Bob have to access channels
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from 1 to k 1. k is determined by the channel capacity andMj , and it is not related
to Alice and Bob. When the channel quality is better, Eve jams this channel with a
larger probability while Alice and Bob access this channel with a smaller probability.
It is simple to verify that N   k+1  2. This implies that Alice and Bob will access
at least two channels. Otherwise, if they access only one channel, this channel will be
jammed by the attacker with probability 1.
 In Chapter 8, we extend the model into multiple access multiple jamming case, in
which case Alice and Bob can access multiple channels in one timeslot, and Eve can
jam multiple channels in one timeslot. In the Nash equilibrium, Alice, Bob and Eve do
not always operate on the same set of channels. k is a variable that is for Alice, Bob
and Eve to decide on which channels they should take actions. k separates \good"
channels and \bad" channels. Alice, Bob and Eve have no motivation to access or jam
channels from 1 to k   1. But in some cases, Alice and Bob have to access channels
from 1 to k 1. k is determined by the channel capacity andMj , and it is not related
to Alice and Bob. When the channel quality is better, Eve jams this channel with a
larger probability while Alice and Bob access this channel with a smaller probability.
It is simple to verify that N   k + 1 Mj + 1. This implies that Alice and Bob will
access at least Mj + 1 channels. Otherwise, if they can access only Mj channels, this
channel will be jammed by the attacker with probability 1.
 In Chapter 9, numerical simulations of our optimal strategies are shown. The proper-
ties of optimal strategies are shown, and we nd that the \waste case" which should
be avoided. The comparison between our optimal strategy and the learning approach
algorithm is shown.
 In Chapter 10, conclusions of this thesis are given.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we introduce the background of strategic games, including zero-sum
game which will be used to model UFH in this thesis in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2, we
introduce and discuss the concept and implications of the Nash equilibrium.
2.1 Zero-sum Game
A strategic game is a model used to model the interaction of a set of decision mak-
ers [27]. The concept of strategic game theory is widely used in economics, political science,
and psychology, as well as logic and biology [27]. In game theory, the decision makers of a
game is referred as players [27]. In a strategic game model, the interactions between players
are aected not only by his own actions, but also by the actions taken by other players [27].
There is a clear distinction between a strategic game and a one party optimization prob-
lem [28]. The players in a strategic game usually do not have complete control of the result
of their actions, which suits the case in UFH with intelligent jammers, but in a one party
optimization problem, the result can be completely controlled by his own actions, so in
strategic game, we usually cannot get a global optimization result [28].
In strategic games, each player has his own action set [27], which is the set of actions the
player can take. The action set can be the same for all players, and can also be dierent for
dierent players. Each player in a game should has preferences over the action set, which
means the player may prefer some actions more than others because those actions can give
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him more reward. Overall, a strategic game consists of a set of players f1;    ; Ng, a action
set Yi = fyig for each player and preferences over the action set for each player [27]. And
the preference is a function of strategy in the action set, and is usually called the payo
function ui, which depends not only on his own action but the actions of other players of
the game.
From the angle of cooperation, there are two types of games: cooperative games and
noncooperative games [27]. In noncooperative games, zero-sum game is one of the most
important form. Zero-sum game is usually used to describe the situation when the players
are in competitive relationship. Players in zero-sum game do not cooperate and the gain of
one player will lead to loss to the other player [28]. As the name of zero-sum game implies,
in zero-sum game the sum of total rewards of all the players is identically zero [27]:
NX
i=1
ui(y1;    ; yN ) = 0: (2.1)
In some games, the sum of the total reward is not zero, but a nonzero constant [27]. We
may refer this kind of games including zero-sum game as \constant-sum" game [27]. One
property of zero-sum game which makes it widely used is that, nonzero constant games can
be easily transformed to zero-sum games without changing the nature of the games [27]. So
when we model a constant-sum game, we always choose zero-sum game for it is the same
in nature as nonzero constant-sum game [27].
2.2 Nash equilibrium
As the previous section stated, in strategic games, the global optimization usually cannot
be reached due to the partial control to the game of each player [28]. This is due to the fact
that the optimal action of one player depends on the actions taken by other players [27].
So when choosing an action a player must take account into the actions taken by other
players [27]. So the \belief" of other players is very important. This \belief" may be from
the past experience of other players and this experience is sucient for the player to predict
what the opponents will behave [27]. Given the other players' strategies, if the player is
rational, he can choose the optimal strategy. Under this circumstance, the optimal strategy
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of each player given other players' strategies is important at the optimization aspect [27].
In game theory, the Nash equilibrium is a solution concept of a non-cooperative game
involving two or more players, in which each player is assumed to know the equilibrium
strategies of the other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only his own
strategy unilaterally [27].
Denition 2.2.1. Let yi denote the strategy of player i, and y i denote the set of strategies
of players except for player i. ui is the payo function of player i. y
 is said to be a Nash
equilibrium if for each player i and every strategy yi taken by the player, y
 is at least as
good as the strategy (yi; y

 i) in which player i chooses yi while every other player j chooses
yj . That is, for every player i and 8 yi,
ui(y
)  ui(yi; y i): (2.2)
This denition can be explained this way: if each player has chosen a strategy and
no player can benet by changing his or her strategy while the other players keep theirs
unchanged, then the current set of strategy choices and the corresponding payos constitute
a Nash equilibrium [27]. In the Nash equilibrium, changing one's own strategy unilaterally
can not lead to a greater reward [27] for him. Everyone is taking his best strategy while
taking into account the decisions of the others [27].
For the UFH problem, if the strategy taken by the legitimate transmitter and receiver
is in the Nash equilibrium, from denition it can be concluded that the jammer cannot do
better even if he knows the strategy of the legitimate transmitter and receiver. So algorithm
of learning the strategy taken by the legitimate transmitter and receiver and then design a
optimal strategy will not work in the Nash equilibrium. This also secures the UFH in the
sense of data rate.
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Chapter 3
Model
In this chapter, we introduce the basic model of our UFH problem. At the same time,
the denition of parameters and the Nash equilibrium in our model are given.
We consider a time-slotted wireless system with N channels, each with channel capacity
Ri, i = 1;    ; N . Without loss of generality, we assume R1  R2  :::  RN . Here, to
assist the presentation, we assume that all terminals can access or jam one channel at any
given time slot. The more general case in which the terminals can access or jam more than
one channel at each time slot will be considered in Chapter 6, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. In
UFH, the transmitter (Alice) and receiver (Bob) hop randomly through these N channels.
We use pti and p
r
i to denote the probabilities that Alice and Bob will access channel i at
any time slot respectively. Furthermore, we dene pt , [pt1;    ; ptN ] and pr , [pr1;    ; prN ]
with
P
pti = 1 and
P
pri = 1. The jammer will jam channel i with a probability p
j
i , and
similarly we dene pj , [pj1;    ; pjN ] with
P
pji = 1. We assume that if Eve chooses to jam
a channel, then the communication between Alice and Bob through that channel will fail.
The transmission between Alice and Bob is successful when Alice and Bob use the same
channel and at the same time and Eve is not jamming this channel. And we use A, B and
E to denote the support set of channels, for channels in the support set, Alice, Bob and
Eve will access or jam with non-zero probabilities.
Figure 3.1 shows 3 dierent scenarios of UFH:
1. In timeslot 1, both transmitter and receiver are in channel 5, while Eve is not in
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Figure 3.1: System model.
channel 5. The transmission is successful.
2. In timeslot 2, the transmitter and receiver are not in the same channel. The trans-
mission is failed.
3. In timeslot 3, both transmitter and receiver are in channel 3, while Eve is also in
channel 3. This transmission is jammed, so the it is failed.
The average throughput of UFH is
R =
NX
i=1
Rip
t
ip
r
i

1  pji

: (3.1)
Clearly, in UFH, Alice and Bob would like to maximize the average throughput, while
Eve would like to minimize it. We model this scenario as a zero-sum game, with Alice and
Bob being one party and Eve being the other party. In this game, the strategy of Alice and
Bob is to choose pt and pr, and the strategy of Eve is to choose pj . The reward for Alice
and Bob is R and the reward for Eve is   R. A strategy pair f(pt;pr);pjg is called a
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Nash equilibrium if
R

pt;pr;pj
  Rpt;pr;pj ; 8pt;pr; (3.2)
  R  pt;pr;pj    Rpt;pr;pj ; 8pj : (3.3)
This implies that neither party will receive a larger reward by unilaterally deviate from this
equilibrium, hence they have no motivation to do so.
23
Chapter 4
Equal Channel Quality Case
In this chapter, we study the case when all the channels have the same capacity, which
is R1 = R2 = ::: = RN . The Nash equilibrium is given at the beginning of this chapter, and
the proof is given in Section 4.1. Remarks are given in Section 4.2.
We can denote
Ri = R; 8i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng: (4.1)
Lemma 4.0.2. In this case, the Nash Equilibrium is:
pti

= pri
 = pji

=
1
N
; (4.2)
for 8i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng.
This result is intuitive which is illustrated in Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.1 shows the channel capacity are the same for all channels. Figure 4.2 shows the
strategy of Alice and Bob, they access all the channels with equal probability. Figure 4.3
shows the strategy of Eve, she jams all the channels with equal probability.
4.1 Proof
The proof is organized as:
Let A, B and E denote the support set for Alice, Bob and Eve respectively. In Sec-
tion 4.1.1,we prove E = f1; 2; :::; Ng. In Section 4.1.2, we prove E  A , E  B, A = B.
So A = B = E = f1; 2; :::; Ng. In Section 4.1.3, we determine the Nash equilibrium.
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Proof. The reward of Alice and Bob accessing channel i is:
Ri

1  pji

= R

1  pji

: (4.3)
The reward of Eve jamming channel i is:
 
NX
j=1;j 6=i
Rjp
t
jp
r
j = S +Rip
t
ip
r
i ; (4.4)
where S =  PNj=1Rjptjprj .
Then we derive the Nash equilibrium step by step.
4.1.1 Prove: E = f1; 2; :::; Ng.
If E 6= f1; 2; :::; Ng, then 9i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng s.t. pji

= 0.
Case 1: pti

= pri
 = 1, then it is obvious for Eve to increase his reward by jamming
channel i. So this is not a Nash equilibrium.
Case 2: pti
 6= 1 and pri  6= 1. Since Eve never jams channel i, so Alice and Bob can
always increase their reward by allocating more probability into channel i. But they cannot
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achieve maximum reward by setting pti

= pri
 = 1. So Alice and Bob can always increase
their reward by changing their strategy unilaterally. This is not a Nash equilibrium.
From above, we can conclude E = f1; 2; :::; Ng.
4.1.2 Prove: E  A , E  B, A = B.
If E * A, then Eve is jamming some channel that is never used by the transmitter. So
Eve can increase his reward by jamming some other channel. So E  A 1. The proof is the
same for E  B.
If A 6= B, then Alice is transmitting on some channel that is can never used by Bob
or Bob is listening on some channel that Alice's message never comes from. This means
Alice or Bob is wasting her or his resources. So Alice and Bob can increase their reward by
allocating their probability on the same set of channels. Thus, A = B.
The above conclusion implies that if all the channel quality are equal, then A = B =
E = f1; 2; :::; Ng.
4.1.3 Determine pt

, pr and pj
First we will show that to achieve the Nash equilibrium, 1  pji

= C0 and p
t
i

pri
 = C1,
where C0 and C1 are constants independent of i.
If 1  pji
 6= C0, then 9l1; l2 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng s.t.
1  pjl1

= maxf1  pji
g; (4.5)
1  pjl1

> 1  pjl2

; (4.6)
where i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng,
R = R[ptl1

prl1


1  pjl1

+ ptl2

prl2


1  pjl2

+
NX
i=1
i6=l1
i6=l2
pti

pri


1  pji

]: (4.7)
So there exist another strategy of Alice and Bob pt
0
and pr
0
, which satisfy that for i 6= l1
1The  symbol does not mean proper set in this thesis.
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and i 6= l2,
pti
0
= pti

; pri
0
= pri
; (4.8)
ptl1
0
> ptl1

; prl1
0
> prl1
; (4.9)
ptl2
0
< ptl2

; ptl2
0
< ptl2

: (4.10)
This implies
ptl1
0
+ ptl2
0
= ptl1

+ ptl2

; (4.11)
prl1
0
+ ptl2
0
= prl1
 + ptl2

: (4.12)
We can always nd strategy pt
0
and pr
0
because we have proved A = B = E = f1; 2; :::; Ng,
which means the probability of accessing each channel in the game is nonzero. It is obvious
that the strategy pt
0
and pr
0
can increase the reward of Alice and Bob. So Alice and Bob
can always increase their reward by moving their probability of accessing channel l2 into
accessing channel l1. Thus this is not a Nash equilibrium. Then 1  pji

= C0. This means
that all the pji

are all equal, so pji

= 1N .
Similar to the proof of 1  pji

= C0, if p
t
i

pri
 6= C1, then 9l3; l4 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng s.t.
ptl3

prl3
 = max ptip
r
i ; (4.13)
ptl3

prl3
 > ptl4

prl4
: (4.14)
So Eve can always increase his reward by moving his probability of jamming channel l4
into jamming channel l3. So this is not a Nash equilibrium. Then in the Nash equilibrium
pti

pri
 = C1.
Under the Nash equilibrium,
R =
NX
i=1
C1

1  1
N

= (N   1)C1: (4.15)
Since Alice and Bob form one party of the game, so the we can take the pair (pt;pr) as the
strategy of Alice and Bob. So Alice and Bob want maximize R, that is, to maximize C1.
We build two vectors
~A1 = [
q
pt1;
q
pt2; :::;
q
ptN ]; (4.16)
~A2 = [
p
pr1;
p
pr2; :::;
p
prN ]; (4.17)
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~A1 and ~A2 are two vector in RN . Then j ~A1j = 1 and j ~A2j = 1.
~A1  ~A2 =
NX
i=1
q
pti
p
pri
 =
NX
i=1
p
C1 = N
p
C1; (4.18)
so we can convert the problem of maximizing C1 into maximizing ~A1  ~A2.
~A1  ~A2 = j ~A1jj ~A2j cos   j ~A1jj ~A2j = 1; (4.19)
the equality holds when  = 0, where  is the measure of angle between ~A1 and ~A2. So we
can maximize C1 by setting  = 0. The two vectors ~A1 and ~A2 have the same length, and
the same direction, so they are equal. So
pti

= pri
 =
p
C1; 8i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng: (4.20)
Then we can determine
pti

= pri
 =
1
N
; 8i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng: (4.21)
From the proof above, Alice and Bob cannot increase their reward by changing to another
strategy unilaterally.
So in the equal channel quality scenario, the Nash Equilibrium is
pti

= pri
 = pji

=
1
N
; (4.22)
for 8i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng.
4.2 Remark
Remark 4.2.1. Since the Nash equilibrium is obtained, the average throughput is
R = R
N   1
N2
: (4.23)
Remark 4.2.2. In the Nash equilibrium, Alice, Bob and Eve always operate on the same
set of channels. In particular, A = B = E = f1;    ; Ng.
Remark 4.2.3. Alice, Bob and Eve always access or jam all channels.
Remark 4.2.4. Alice, Bob and Eve access or jam each channel with equal probability.
Remark 4.2.5. R is a decreasing function of N for N  2. Notice R reach maximum
when N = 2.
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Chapter 5
General Channel Quality Case
In this chapter, we study the a more general case, R1  R2  :::  RN . We characterize
the Nash equilibrium of the game for this general channel quality case. During the deriva-
tion, we also study the properties of the strategies that achieve this equilibrium. The Nash
equilibrium is given at the beginning of this chapter, and the proof is given in Section 5.1.
Remarks are given in Section 5.2.
Lemma 5.0.6. The unique Nash equilibrium of this game is
pti

= pri
 =
1p
RiPN
l=k
1p
Rl
; (5.1)
pji

= 1 
N k
RiPN
l=k
1
Rl
; (5.2)
for k  i  N , where k = min

kjRk > N kPN
i=k
1
Ri

, and
pti

= pri
 = pji

= 0; 8i < k: (5.3)
Figure 5.1, Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 give an example to illustrate our results. Figure 5.1
shows the channel capacity. Figure 5.2 shows the strategy of Alice and Bob, we can see that
Alice and Bob only access channels from k to N , and when the channel quality is better,
Alice and Bob access this channel with a smaller probability. Figure 5.3 shows the strategy
of Eve, we can see that Eve only jams channels from k to N , and when the channel quality
is better Eve jams this channel with a larger probability.
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Figure 5.1: Channel Quality (N = 15, k = 12).
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Figure 5.2: P t

(= P r) (N = 15, k = 12).
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Figure 5.3: P j

(N = 15, k = 12).
5.1 Proof
Proof. The proof is organized as follows. In Section 5.1.1, we show that in the Nash equi-
librium if Eve jams channel k with a non-zero probability, it will jam all channels that
have better channel qualities with a non-zero probability. Hence, there exists a number
1  k  N , such that the jamming set E has the form E = fk; k + 1; :::; Ng. In Sec-
tion 5.1.2, we show that E  A, E  B and A = B. In Section 5.1.3, we show that
A = B = E and determine the Nash equilibrium.
Before proceeding to the detailed proof, we have the following facts.
1. The reward of Alice and Bob both accessing channel i is
Ri

1  pji

: (5.4)
2. The reward of Eve jamming channel i is
 
NX
j=1;j 6=i
Rjp
t
jp
r
j = S +Rip
t
ip
r
i ; (5.5)
where S ,  PNj=1Rjptjprj .
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Figure 5.4: Proof for E = fk; k + 1; :::; Ng.
5.1.1 Prove: if pjk

> 0, then pji

> 0 for all i > k. Hence, there exists a
number k such that E has the form E = fk; k + 1; :::; Ng.
We will prove this by contradiction. Figure 5.4 shows the idea how to prove this. Suppose
this claim is not true, then in the Nash equilibrium strategy of Eve pj

, there exists some
k1 > k such that p
j
k1
= 0 and pjk

> 0. That is, Eve gives up jamming some channel that
is not the worst in her support set. In this case, the reward of Alice and Bob accessing
channel k1 is
Rk1

1  pjk1

= Rk1 : (5.6)
Then we have
Rk1  Rk > Rk

1  pjk

:
We then have the following two cases, each of which will lead to a contradiction.
Case 1: If pt

k = p
r
k = 0, that is Alice and Bob never use channel k. Then Eve
can increase its reward by reducing the probability of jamming channel k to zero. This
contradicts with the denition of the Nash equilibrium.
Case 2: If pt

k > 0 or p
r
k > 0, then Alice and Bob can increase their rewards by
transferring their probability from channel k to channel k1. This contradicts with the
denition of the Nash equilibrium.
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Figure 5.5: Proof for E  A.
Figure 5.6: Proof for A = B.
This completes the proof that in the Nash equilibrium, E must have the form E =
fk; k + 1; :::; Ng with 1  k  N .
5.1.2 Prove: E  A, E  B and A = B
Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 show the idea how to prove this. If E * A, namely EnA 6= ,
then Eve is jamming some channels that are never used by the transmitter. Here EnA ,
fkjk 2 E and k =2 Ag, and  is the empty set. So Eve can increase his reward by moving
jamming probabilities from channels in EnA to channels in A, which contradicts the def-
inition of the Nash equilibrium. Hence, in the Nash equilibrium, we have E  A 1. The
proof of E  B is the same. If A 6= B, then Alice is transmitting on some channel that
1The  symbol does not mean proper set in this thesis.
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is can never used by Bob or Bob is listening on some channel that Alice's message never
comes from. This means Alice or Bob is wasting her or his resources. So Alice and Bob
can increase their reward by allocating their probability on the same set of channels. Thus,
A = B.
Now, we show A = B = fk1; k1 + 1; :::; Ng with k   1  k1  k. Because we have
proved E  A, E  B and A = B, so we have two cases:
Case 1: A = B = E, so k1 = k
.
Case 2: E  A and E 6= A. Since Eve never jams channel 1 to k   1, so for channel 1
to k   1,
k 1X
i=1
Rip
t
ip
r
i  Rk 1
k 1X
i=1
ptip
r
i  Rk 1
 
k 1X
i=1
pti
! 
k 1X
i=1
pri
!
: (5.7)
The equality holds when Alice and Bob access channel 1 to k 2 with probability zero. So
Alice and Bob should put all their probability from channel 1 to k  2 into channel k  1.
Then Alice and Bob should set k1 = k
   1. So A = B = fk   1; k; :::; Ng.
5.1.3 Determine pt

, pr and pj
Figure 5.7, Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9 show the high level idea how to determine pt

,
pr and pj. In the Nash equilibrium, in the support set, the reward should be equal to a
constant. Intuitively, if this is not true, the other party will nd the channel with maximum
of the reward and use this channel. Next, the concrete proof is provided.
From the side of Eve, Eve is not going to jam channel k   1. So we have
Rk 1pt

k 1p
r
k 1  Rkpt

kp
r
k = Rk+1p
t
k+1p
r
k+1 = ::: = RNp
t
Np
r
N = C1; (5.8)
where C1 is a constant.
We have
Rk 1pt

k 1p
r
k 1  C1; (5.9)
because if this inequality does not hold, then Eve can increase her reward by jamming
channel k   1 and thus contradicts with the denition of the Nash equilibrium.
From the side of Alice and Bob, we have
Rk 1 = Rk

1  pjk

= Rk+1

1  pjk+1

= ::: = RN

1  pjN

= C0; (5.10)
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Figure 5.7: Channel capacity.
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Figure 5.8: Rewards of Alice and Bob for accessing each channel.
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Figure 5.9: Rewards of Eve for accessing each channel.
where C0 is a constant.
So this implies
Rk 1 < Rk  Rk+1  :::  RN : (5.11)
We can nd pj

rst. From the discussion above, we know Ri(1   pj

i ) = C0 for 8i 2
fk; k + 1; :::; Ng. Then we have pji = 1   C0Ri for 8i 2 fk; k + 1; :::; Ng. Summing p
j
i
from k to N , we have
1 =
NX
l=k
pj

l =
NX
l=k

1  C0
Rl

= (N   k + 1)  C0
NX
l=k
1
Rl
:
From this, we have
C0 =
N   kPN
l=k
1
Rl
;
pj

i = 1 
N k
RiPN
l=k
1
Rl
:
So we have C0 < Rk  Rk+1  :::  RN . If Rm satises
Rm >
N  mPN
i=m
1
Ri
; (5.12)
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then for m+ 1,
Rm
 
NX
i=m
1
Ri
!
> N  m;
Rm
 
NX
i=m+1
1
Ri
!
+ 1 > N  m;
Rm+1
 
NX
i=m+1
1
Ri
!
> N   (m+ 1);
Rm+1 >
N   (m+ 1)PN
i=m+1
1
Ri
;
m+ 1 also satises the inequality. The third inequality use the fact that Rm+1  Rm. By
induction, we can conclude that if k is in the set

kjRk > N kPN
i=k
1
Ri

, then all the numbers
from k to N are also in that set. So for
j < min
(
kjRk > N   kPN
i=k
1
Ri
)
; (5.13)
we have
Rj  N   jPN
i=j
1
Ri
: (5.14)
Next, we show that
k = km , min
(
kjRk > N   kPN
i=k
1
Ri
)
: (5.15)
We show this by contradiction. Suppose k = k0 6= km, we have the following two cases:
1. If k
0
> km, the reward of Alice and Bob accessing channel i  k0 is
Ri

1  pji

=
N   k0PN
l=k
0 1Rl
: (5.16)
From the discussion above, we know that for i < k
0
, pj

i = 0. The reward of Alice and
Bob accessing channel k
0   1 is Rk0 1. We have k
0   1  km, so
Rk0 1 >
N  

k
0   1

PN
l=k
0 1
1
Rl
;
Rk0 1
0@ NX
l=k
0
1
Rl
+
1
Rk0 1
1A > N   k + 1;
Rk0 1 >
N   k0PN
l=k
0 1Rl
= Rk0

1  pj
k0

:
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The right hand side term is the reward of Alice and Bob acessing channel k
0
. So the
reward of Alice and Bob accessing channel k
0   1 is better than accessing channel
k
0
. Hence, Alice and Bob has the motivation to deviate from this strategy, which
contradicts the denition of Nash equilibrium.
2. If k
0
< km, then
Rk0 
N   k0PN
l=k0
1
Rl
; (5.17)
so
pj
k0
= 1 
N k0
RiPN
l=k
0 1Rl
 0:
This contradicts with our assumption that E = fk0 ; k0+1; :::; Ng which means pj
k0
> 0.
So in the Nash equilibrium,
k = min
(
kjRk > N   kPN
i=k
1
Ri
)
; (5.18)
pji

= 1 
N k
RiPN
l=k
1
Rl
; 8i 2 fk; k + 1; :::; Ng: (5.19)
In the following, we characterize pt

and pr

.
First we show that k1 = k
. If k1 = k   1, then we have
Rk 1 = C0 =
N   kPN
i=k
1
Ri
and
Rk  Rk 1:
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The total reward of Alice and Bob is
R =
NX
i=k1
Rip
t
ip
r
i (1  pji

)
= Rk 1ptk 1p
r
k 1 + C0
 
NX
i=k
ptip
r
i
!
= C0
 
ptk 1p
r
k 1 + p
t
kp
r
k +
NX
i=k+1
ptip
r
i
!
 C0
"
(ptk 1 + p
t
k)(p
r
k 1 + p
r
k) +
NX
i=k+1
ptip
r
i
#
= C0
"
ptk
0
prk
0
+
NX
i=k+1
ptip
r
i
#
;
and the equality holds when ptk 1 = p
r
k 1 = 0. So the reward of Alice and Bob will
increase if they transfer their eort of accessing channel k   1 to accessing channel k. So
k1 = k
   1 is not a Nash equilibrium. So k1 = k.
Since k1 = k
, we can build two vectors ~A1 and ~A2,
~A1 = [
q
pt

1 ;
q
pt

2 ; :::;
q
pt

N ];
~A2 = [
q
pr

1 ;
q
pr

2 ; :::;
q
pr

N ];
~A1 and ~A2 are two vector in RN . Then j ~A1j = 1 and j ~A2j = 1.
~A1  ~A2 =
NX
i=k
q
pt

i p
r
i
=
NX
i=k
r
C1
Ri
 j ~A1jj ~A2j = 1;
the equality holds when ~A1 and ~A2 have the same direction. ~A1 and ~A2 also have same
length, so they are equal. Then
C1 =
1PN
l=k
1p
Rl
2 :
So
pti

= pri
 =
r
C1
Ri
=
1p
RiPN
l=k
1p
Rl
:
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So the Nash equilibrium is
pti

= pri
 =
1p
RiPN
l=k
1p
Rl
;
pji

= 1 
N k
RiPN
l=k
1
Rl
;
for k  i  N , where k = minfkjRk > N kPN
i=k
1
Ri
g.
5.2 Remark
Remark 5.2.1. Since the Nash equilibrium is obtained, the average throughput is
R =
N   kPN
l=k
1p
Rl
2 : (5.20)
Remark 5.2.2. In the Nash equilibrium, Alice, Bob and Eve always operate on the same
set of channels. In particular, A = B = E = fk;    ; Ng.
Remark 5.2.3. Alice, Bob and Eve do not always access or jam all channels. k is a
variable that is for Alice, Bob and Eve to decide on which channels they should take actions.
Figure 5.10 shows k separates \good" channels and \bad" channels. Alice, Bob and Eve
have no motivation to access or jam channels from 1 to k   1.
Figure 5.10: k separates \good" channels and \bad" channels.
Remark 5.2.4. When the channel quality is better, Eve jams this channel with a larger
probability while Alice and Bob access this channel with a smaller probability.
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Remark 5.2.5. It is simple to verify that N   k+1  2. This implies that Alice and Bob
will access at least two channels. Otherwise, if they access only one channel, this channel
will be jammed by the attacker with probability 1.
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Chapter 6
One Access Multiple Jamming
Case
In this chapter, we assume that Eve can jam more than one channels simultaneously,
while Alice and Bob can transmit and receive through only one channel each time. Let Mj
denote the number of channels Eve can jam simultaneously, 1  Mj  N . Let 
E denote
the set of channels Eve jams, where 
E has Mj elements. So p
j
i =
P

E
i2
E
pj
E .
The Nash equilibrium is given at the beginning of this chapter, and the proof is given
in Section 6.1. Remarks about this case are given in Section 6.2.
Lemma 6.0.6. The Nash Equilibrium in this case is,
pti

= pri
 =
1p
RiPN
l=k
1p
Rl
; (6.1)
pji

= 1 
(N k+1) Mj
RiPN
l=k
1
Rl
; (6.2)
for k  i  N , where k = min

kjRk > (N k+1) MjPN
i=k
1
Ri

, and
pti

= pri
 = pji

= 0; 8i < k: (6.3)
Figure 6.1, Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3 give an example to illustrate our results with
Mj = 2. Figure 6.1 shows the channel capacity. Figure 6.2 shows the strategy of Alice
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Figure 6.1: Channel Quality (N = 15, k = 12).
and Bob, we can see that Alice and Bob only access channels from k to N , and when
the channel quality is better, Alice and Bob access this channel with a smaller probability.
Figure 6.3 shows the strategy of Eve, we can see that Eve only jams channels from k to
N , and when the channel quality is better Eve jams this channel with a larger probability.
6.1 Proof
Proof. Similarly, the can prove that E = fk; k+1; :::; Ng and A = B = fk1; k1+1; :::; Ng,
k   1  k1  k. The strategy of Eve in the Nash equilibrium be found, then we can get
A = B = E. Then we can get the Nash Equilibrium using vector.
The reward of Alice and Bob accessing channel i is
Ri
0BB@1  X

E
i2
E
pj
E
1CCA ;
where pj
E is the probability for Eve to choose jamming channel set 
E .
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Figure 6.2: P t

(= P r) (N = 15, k = 12).
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Figure 6.3: P j

(N = 15, k = 12).
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The reward of Eve jamming channel i is
X

E
i2
E
0@  X
j =2
E
Rjp
t
jp
r
j
1A =X 
Ei2
E
0@S + X
j2
E
Rjp
t
jp
r
j
1A ;
where S =  Pj Rjptjprj .
Similarly, the can prove that E = fk; k + 1; :::; Ng and A = B = fk1; k1 + 1; :::; Ng,
k   1  k1  k. To achieve the Nash equilibrium,
Ri
0BB@1  X

E
i2
E
pj
E

1CCA = C1; 8i  k (6.4)
X

E
i2
E
0@S + X
j2
E
Rjp
t
j

prj

1A = C2;8i  k1 (6.5)
where C1, C2 are constants independent of 
E .
From
Ri
0BB@1  X

E
i2
E
pj
E

1CCA = C1;
we have
1 
X

E
i2
E
pj
E

=
C1
Ri
;
NX
i=k
0BB@1  X

E
i2
E
pj
E

1CCA = NX
i=k
C1
Ri
;
(N   k + 1) 
NX
i=k
X

E
i2
E
pj
E

= C1
NX
i=k
1
Ri
;
(N   k + 1) 
 
N k
Mj 1

(N   k + 1) 
N k+1
Mj
 = C1 NX
i=k
1
Ri
;
C1 =
(N   k + 1) MjPN
i=k
1
Ri
;
pji

=
X


i2

pj
E

= 1 
(N k+1) Mj
RiPN
l=k
1
Rl
:
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Similarly, we can prove
k = min
(
kjRk > (N   k + 1) MjPN
i=k
1
Ri
)
: (6.6)
Obviously, k  N  Mj , that is, Eve has at least Mj + 1 channels to jam, then Alice and
Bob have at least Mj + 1 channels to access.
From X

E
i2
E
0@S + X
j2
E
Rjp
t
j

prj

1A = C2;
noting S is the same for all dierent i and
jf
E ji 2 
Egj =

N   k1
Mj   1

(6.7)
is independent of i, we can rewrite equation 6.7 as
X

E
i2
E
X
j2
E
Rjp
t
j

prj
 = C3; (6.8)
where C3 is independent of i.
Let us consider two dierent channels i and j,
X

E
i2
E
X
m2
E
Rmp
t
m

prm
 =
X

E
j2
E
X
m2
E
Rmp
t
m

prm
;
X

E
i2
E ;j2
E
X
m2
E
Rmp
t
m

prm
 +
X

E
i2
E ;j =2
E
X
m2
E
Rmp
t
m

prm

=
X

E
i2
E ;j2
E
X
m2
E
Rmp
t
m

prm
 +
X

E
i=2
E ;j2
E
X
m2
E
Rmp
t
m

prm
;
X

E
i2
E ;j =2
E
X
m2
E
Rmp
t
m

prm
 =
X

E
i=2
E ;j2
E
X
m2
E
Rmp
t
m

prm
;
X

E
i2
E ;j =2
E
X
m2
Enfig
Rmp
t
m

prm
 +
X

E
i2
E ;j =2
E
Rip
t
i

pri

=
X

E
i=2
E ;j2
E
X
m2
Enfjg
Rmp
t
m

prm
 +
X

E
i=2
E ;j2
E
Rjp
t
j

prj
;
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Notice that X

E
i2
E ;j =2
E
X
m2
Enfig
Rmp
t
m

prm
 =
X

1
i=2
1;j =2
1
X
m2
1
Rmp
t
m

prm
;
X

E
i=2
E ;j2
E
X
m2
Enfjg
Rmp
t
m

prm
 =
X

1
i=2
1;j =2
1
X
m2
1
Rmp
t
m

prm
;
where 
1 is a M   1 set. So we haveX

E
i2
E ;j =2
E
Rip
t
i

pri
 =
X

E
i=2
E ;j2
E
Rjp
t
j

prj
;
that is
jf
ji 2 
; j =2 
gjRiptipri  = jf
ji =2 
; j 2 
gjRjptjprj:
Because
jf
ji 2 
; j =2 
gj = jf
ji =2 
; j 2 
gj =

N   k   1
Mj   2

;
so we have
Rip
t
i

pri
 = Rjptj

prj
;
thus
Rip
t
i

pri
 = C4;
for all i, where C4 is a constant independent of i.
Then we transform our problem into this: For Alice and Bob, nd the optimal solution
of
R =
X
i2A
Rip
t
i

pri

0BB@1  X

E
i2
E
pj
E

1CCA ; (6.9)
X

E
i2
E
pj
E

= 1 
(N k+1) Mj
RiPN
i=k
1
Ri
; (6.10)
Rip
t
i

pri
 = C3: (6.11)
This problem has been solved in Chapter 5. Using the same method, we can prove
k1 = k
. Then the Nash equilibrium for Alice and Bob is
pti

= pri
 =
1p
RiPN
l=k
1p
Rl
; 8k  i  N:
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So for the multiple jamming case, the Nash equilibrium is
pti

= pri
 =
1p
RiPN
i=k
1p
Ri
;
pji

= 1 
(N k+1) Mj
RiPN
l=k
1
Rl
;
(6.12)
where k = min

kjRk > (N k+1) MjPN
i=k
1
Ri

, and
pti

= pri
 = pji

= 0; 8i < k: (6.13)
Notice that 
E is a Mj-element set and the element are chosen without replacement
in fk; k + 1; :::; Ng. So 
E can take
 
N k+1
Mj

values. In the Nash equilibrium, we have
(N   k + 1) equations. It can be easily veried that N   k + 1  2. So  N k+1Mj  >
(N   k + 1) for Mj  2, which means pj
E has innite number of solutions. So Eve has
innite number of specic strategies in the Nash equilibrium, but these strategies have to
satisfy X

E
i2
E
pj
E

= 1 
(N k+1) Mj
RiPN
l=k
1
Rl
:
6.2 Remark
Remark 6.2.1. Since the Nash equilibrium is obtained, the average throughput is
R =
N   k + 1 MjPN
l=k
1p
Rl
2 : (6.14)
Remark 6.2.2. In the Nash equilibrium, Alice, Bob and Eve always operate on the same
set of channels. In particular, A = B = E = fk;    ; Ng.
Remark 6.2.3. Alice, Bob and Eve do not always access or jam all channels. k is a
variable that is for Alice, Bob and Eve to decide on which channels they should take actions.
Figure 6.4 shows k separates \good" channels and \bad" channels. Alice, Bob and Eve have
no motivation to access or jam channels from 1 to k   1.
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Remark 6.2.4. k is determined by the channel capacity and Mj, and it is not related to
Alice and Bob.
Figure 6.4: k separates \good" channels and \bad" channels.
Remark 6.2.5. When the channel quality is better, Eve jams this channel with a larger
probability while Alice and Bob access this channel with a smaller probability.
Remark 6.2.6. It is simple to verify that N   k + 1  Mj + 1. This implies that Alice
and Bob will access at least Mj + 1 channels. Otherwise, if they access only Mj channels,
this channel will be jammed by the attacker with probability 1.
Remark 6.2.7. Alice and Bob have a unique Nash equilibrium, while Eve has innite
number of strategies in the Nash equilibrium if Mj  2. The Nash equilibrium of Eve is
given in the form of marginal distribution.
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Chapter 7
Multiple Access One Jamming
Case
In this chapter, we study the case the sender and receiver can access multiple channels
in one time slot, but the attacker can only jam one channel at a time. We assume Alice
and Bob can access Mt and Mr channels respectively, where 1 Mt  N and 1 Mr  N .
The strategy of Alice and Bob taken in a time slot is denoted by 
A and 
B. Obviously,

A and 
B are subset of A and B , and 
A and 
B are Mt set and Mr set respectively.
Let pti denote
P

A
i2
A
pt
A , and p
r
i denote
P

B
i2
B
pr
B . S is a subset of f1; 2; :::; Ng, then
RS ,
P
i2S Ri. And without loss of generality, we can assume Mt Mr.
The Nash equilibrium is given at the beginning of this chapter, and the proof is given
in Section 7.1. Remarks about this case are given in Section 7.2.
Lemma 7.0.8. The Nash equilibrium in this case is given under three dierent conditions:
1. Case 1:
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If N   k + 1 > Mt,
pti

=
Mtp
RiPN
l=k
1p
Rl
; (7.1)
pri
 =
Mrp
RiPN
l=k
1p
Rl
; (7.2)
pji

= 1 
N k
RiPN
l=k
1
Rl
; (7.3)
for k  i  N ,
where k = min

kjRk > N kPN
i=k
1
Ri

, and
pti

= pri
 = pji

= 0; 8i < k: (7.4)
2. Case 2:
If Mt  N   k + 1 > Mr,
pti

= 1; (7.5)
for N  Mt + 1  i  N ,
pri
 =
Mrp
RiPN
l=k
1p
Rl
; (7.6)
pji

= 1 
N k
RiPN
l=k
1
Rl
; (7.7)
for k  i  N ,
where k = min

kjRk > N kPN
i=k
1
Ri

, and
pti

= 0; 8i < N  Mt + 1; (7.8)
pri
 = pji

= 0; 8i < k: (7.9)
3. Case 3:
If N   k + 1 Mr,
pti

=
Mtp
RiPN
l=kt
1p
Rl
; kt  i  N
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Figure 7.1: Illustration of case 1 in one access multiple jamming case.
Figure 7.2: Illustration of case 2 in one access multiple jamming case.
pri
 =
Mrp
RiPN
l=kt
1p
Rl
; kt  i  N
pji

= 1 
N k
RiPN
l=k
1
Rl
; k  i  N
where k = min

kjRk > N kPN
i=k
1
Ri

, kt = max
(
kj
Mtp
RkPN
i=k
1p
Ri
 1
)
.
Figure 7.1, Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3 illustrate the three cases respectively, and notice
the brackets denote the number of channels one can access or jam, not the strategy. We
can see that case 1 is the case Alice and Bob cannot access all the channels from k to N ,
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Figure 7.3: Illustration of case 3 in one access multiple jamming case.
case 2 is the case only one of Alice and Bob can access all the channels from k to N , and
case 3 is the case both Alice and Bob can access all the channels from k to N .
 Figure 7.4 shows the channel capacity.
 Figure 7.5 and Figure 7.6 give an example to illustrate case 1 with Mt = Mr = 2.
Figure 7.5 shows the strategy of Alice and Bob, we can see that Alice and Bob only
access channels from k to N , and when the channel quality is better, Alice and Bob
access this channel with a smaller probability. Figure 7.6 shows the strategy of Eve,
we can see that Eve only jams channels from k to N , and when the channel quality
is better Eve jams this channel with a larger probability.
 Figure 7.7, Figure 7.8 and Figure 7.9 give an example to illustrate case 2 withMt = 4,
Mr = 2. Figure 7.7 shows the strategy of Alice, we can see that Alice takes constant
strategy. Figure 7.8 shows the strategy of Bob, we can see that Bob only access
channels from k to N , and when the channel quality is better, Bob access this channel
with a smaller probability. Figure 7.9 shows the strategy of Eve, we can see that Eve
only jams channels from k to N , and when the channel quality is better Eve jams
this channel with a larger probability.
 Figure 7.10, Figure 7.11 and Figure 7.12 give an example to illustrate case 2 with
Mt = 4, Mr = 4. Figure 7.10 and Figure 7.11 shows the strategy of Alice and Bob,
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Figure 7.4: Channel Quality (N = 15, k = 13).
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Figure 7.5: Case 1: P t

(= P r) (N = 15, k = 13).
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Figure 7.6: Case 1: P j

(N = 15, k = 13).
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Figure 7.7: Case 2: P t

(N = 15, k = 13).
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Figure 7.8: Case 2: P r (N = 15, k = 13).
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Figure 7.9: Case 2: P j

(N = 15, k = 13).
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Figure 7.10: Case 3: P t

(N = 15, k = 13).
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Figure 7.11: Case 3: P r (N = 15, k = 13).
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Figure 7.12: Case 3: P j

(N = 15, k = 13).
we can see that both Alice and Bob take constant strategy. Figure 7.12 shows the
strategy of Eve, we can see that Eve only jams channels from k to N , and when the
channel quality is better Eve jams this channel with a larger probability.
7.1 Proof
Proof. The reward of Alice and Bob accessing channel i is
X

A;
B
i2
A;i2
B
0@ X
m2
A\
B
R
A\
Bnfmgp
j
m +
X
m=2
A\
B
Rm=2
A\
Bp
j
m
1A
=
X

A;
B
i2
A;i2
B
24 X
m2
A\
B
(R
A\
B  Rm) pjm +R
A\
B
0@1  X
m2
A\
B
pjm
1A35
=
X

A;
B
i2
A;i2
B
X
m2
A\
B
Rm
 
1  pjm

(7.10)
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The reward of Eve jamming channel i is
 
X

A;
B
R
A\
Bnfigp
t

A
pr
B
=  
X

A;
B
i2
A\
B
R
A\
Bnfigp
t

A
pr
B  
X

A;
B
i=2
A\
B
R
A\
Bp
t

A
pr
B
=  
X

A;
B
i2
A\
B
(R
A\
B  Ri) pt
Apr
B  
X

A;
B
i=2
A\
B
R
A\
Bp
t

A
pr
B
=  
X

A;
B
R
A\
Bp
t

A
pr
B +Ri
X

A;
B
i2
A\
B
pt
Ap
r

B
To achieve the Nash equilibrium, in support set E,
 
X

A;
B
R
A\
Bp
t

A

pr
B
 +Ri
X

A;
B
i2
A\
B
pt
A

pr
B
 = C0
where C0 is a constant independent of i, notice
 
X

A;
B
R
A\
Bp
t

A

pr
B

is constant for all i, so
Ri
X

A;
B
i2
A\
B
pt
A

pr
B
 = C1; (7.11)
where C1 is a constant independent of i. And in support set A and B,X

A;
B
i2
A;i2
B
X
m2
A\
B
Rm

1  pjm

= C2; (7.12)
where C2 is a constant independent of 
A and 
B.
From
Ri
X

A;
B
i2
A\
B
pt
A

pr
B
 = C1;
for
pti ,
X
i2
A
pt
A
and
pri ,
X
i2
B
pt
B ;
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then we have
Ri
X

A;
B
i2
A\
B
pt
A

pr
B

= Ri
0@X
i2
A
pt
A

1A0@X
i2
B
pr
B

1A
= Rip
t
i

pri

= C1:
From X

A;
B
i2
A;i2
B
X
m2
A\
B
Rm

1  pjm

= C2;
consider two dierent channels i and j,
X

A;
B
i2
A;i2
B
X
m2
A\
B
Rm

1  pjm

=
X

A;
B
j2
A;j2
B
X
m2
A\
B
Rm

1  pjm

;
X

A;
B
i2
A;i2
B
0@ X
m2
A\
Bnfig
Rm

1  pjm

+Ri

1  pji
1A
=
X

A;
B
j2
A;j2
B
0@ X
m2
A\
Bnfjg
Rm

1  pjm

+Rj

1  pjj
1A ;
Now we investigate
X

A;
B
i2
A;i2
B
X
m2
A\
Bnfig
Rm

1  pjm

=
X

A;
B
i2
A;i2
B
j2
A;j2
B
X
m2
A\
Bnfig
Rm

1  pjm

+
X

A;
B
i2
A;i2
B
j =2
A;j2
B
X
m2
A\
Bnfig
Rm

1  pjm

+
X

A;
B
i2
A;i2
B
j2
A;j =2
B
X
m2
A\
Bnfig
Rm

1  pjm

+
X

A;
B
i2
A;i2
B
j =2
A;j =2
B
X
m2
A\
Bnfig
Rm

1  pjm

;
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X

A;
B
j2
A;j2
B
X
m2
A\
Bnfjg
Rm

1  pjm

=
X

A;
B
j2
A;j2
B
i2
A;i2
B
X
m2
A\
Bnfjg
Rm

1  pjm

+
X

A;
B
j2
A;j2
B
i=2
A;i2
B
X
m2
A\
Bnfjg
Rm

1  pjm

+
X

A;
B
j2
A;j2
B
i2
A;i=2
B
X
m2
A\
Bnfjg
Rm

1  pjm

+
X

A;
B
j2
A;j2
B
i=2
A;i=2
B
X
m2
A\
Bnfjg
Rm

1  pjm

:
Let 
A1 denote a Mt   1 set, soX

A;
B
i2
A;i2
B
j =2
A;j2
B
X
m2
A\
Bnfig
Rm

1  pjm

=
X

A1 ;
B
i=2
A1 ;j2
B
j =2
A1 ;i2
B
X
m2
A1\
B
Rm

1  pjm

;
and
X

A;
B
j2
A;j2
B
i=2
A;i2
B
X
m2
A\
Bnfjg
Rm

1  pjm

=
X

A1 ;
B
i=2
A1 ;j2
B
j =2
A1 ;i2
B
X
m2
A1\
B
Rm

1  pjm

:
So we have,
X

A;
B
j2
A;j2
B
i=2
A;i2
B
X
m2
A\
Bnfjg
Rm

1  pjm

=
X

A;
B
j2
A;j2
B
i=2
A;i2
B
X
m2
A\
Bnfjg
Rm

1  pjm

:
Similarly, we can prove
X

A;
B
i2
A;i2
B
j2
A;j =2
B
X
m2
A\
Bnfig
Rm

1  pjm

=
X

A;
B
j2
A;j2
B
i2
A;i=2
B
X
m2
A\
Bnfjg
Rm

1  pjm

and
X

A;
B
j2
A;j2
B
i=2
A;i=2
B
X
m2
A\
Bnfjg
Rm

1  pjm

=
X

A;
B
j2
A;j2
B
i=2
A;i=2
B
X
m2
A\
Bnfjg
Rm

1  pjm

:
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Notice
X

A;
B
i2
A;i2
B
j2
A;j2
B
X
m2
A\
Bnfig
Rm

1  pjm

=
X

A;
B
i2
A;i2
B
j2
A;j2
B
X
m2
A\
B
Rm

1  pjm

 
X

A;
B
i2
A;i2
B
j2
A;j2
B
Ri

1  pji

;
and
X

A;
B
j2
A;j2
B
i2
A;i2
B
X
m2
A\
Bnfjg
Rm

1  pjm

=
X

A;
B
j2
A;j2
B
i2
A;i2
B
X
m2
A\
B
Rm

1  pjm

 
X

A;
B
j2
A;j2
B
i2
A;i2
B
Rj

1  pjj

;
Hence we have,
X

A;
B
i2
A\
B ;j =2
A\
B
Ri

1  pji

=
X

A;
B
j2
A\
B ;i=2
A\
B
Rj

1  pjj

:
Similar in Chapter 6, Ri

1  pji

= Rj

1  pjj

, we have
Ri(1  pji

) = C3; 8i  k:
Similarly, we can give the solution as
pji

= 1 
N k
RiPN
i=k
1
Ri
; (7.13)
for k  i  N , where k = min

kjRk > N kPN
i=k
1
Ri

.
Now we can notice k is determined by the channel quality, but Mt and Mr are deter-
mined by users. From discussion in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, we notice that Alice and
Bob have no motivation to access channels from 1 to k   1. So we should discuss dierent
cases.
63
If N   k + 1 > Mt, from conclusion in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 we have k1 = k, we
can simplify our problem as,
Rip
t
i

pri
 = C1; 8i  k;
NX
i=k
pti

= Mt;
NX
i=k
pti

= Mr:
Using the same vector method Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, we have
pti

=
Mtp
RiPN
l=k
1p
Rl
;
pri
 =
Mrp
RiPN
l=k
1p
Rl
;
But there is still one question unanswered: Is pti

< 1 and pri
 < 1? Now we dene we set:
K1 =
(
kjRk > N   kPN
i=k
1
Ri
)
;
K2 =
8<:kjpRk > N   kPN
i=k
1p
Ri
9=; :
For 8k 2 K1,
NX
i=k
Rk
Ri
> N   k:
This is because
Rk
Ri
 1; 8i  k;
so p
Rkp
Ri
 Rk
Ri
:
Then we have
NX
i=k
p
Rkp
Ri

NX
i=k
Rk
Ri
> N   k:
So k is also in K2. So minK1  minK2. So for k = minfkjRk > N kPN
i=k
1
Ri
g,
p
Rk >
N   kPN
l=k
1p
Rl
 MtPN
l=k
1p
Rl
:
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Figure 7.13: k separates \good" channels and \bad" channels.
So pti

< 1. The proof is same for pri
 < 1.
If Mt  N   k + 1 > Mr, Alice can cover all the channel from k to N , while Bob
cannot. C3 =
N kPN
l=k
1
Rl
 Rm where m = 1; 2; :::; k   1 , and we know Alice and Bob have
no motivation to access channels except channel k to N . So Alice have to constantly access
channels from N  Mt + 1 to N , and the strategy of Bob keeps random.
IfMr  N k+1, both Alice and Bob can cover all the channel from k to N . We know
Alice and Bob have no motivation to access channels except channel k to N , however, both
Alice and Bob have to access some other channel to accessMt andMr channels respectively.
So both Alice and Bob will access some channels below k.
7.2 Remark
Remark 7.2.1. Under the Nash equilibrium in this case, Alice, Bob and Eve do not always
operate on the same set of channels.
Remark 7.2.2. k is a variable that is for Alice, Bob and Eve to decide on which channels
they should take actions. Figure 7.13 shows k separates \good" channels and \bad" chan-
nels. Alice, Bob and Eve have no motivation to access or jam channels from 1 to k   1.
But in Case 2 and Case 3, Alice and Bob have to access channels from 1 to k   1.
Remark 7.2.3. k is determined by the channel capacity and Mj, and it is not related to
Alice and Bob.
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Remark 7.2.4. When the channel quality is better, Eve jams this channel with a larger
probability while Alice and Bob access this channel with a smaller probability.
Remark 7.2.5. It is simple to verify that N   k+1  2. This implies that Alice and Bob
will access at least two channels. Otherwise, if they access only one channel, this channel
will be jammed by the attacker with probability 1.
Remark 7.2.6. Alice and Bob do not have a unique Nash equilibrium if Mt  2 and
Mr  2, while Eve has unique strategy under the Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium
of Alice and Bob is given in the form of marginal distribution.
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Chapter 8
Multiple Access Multiple Jamming
Case
In this chapter, we study the case Alice, Bob and Eve can access or jam more than one
channel simultaneously. Alice and Bob can access Mt and Mr channels respectively, while
Eve can jam Mj channels, 1  Mt  N , 1  Mr  N and 1  Mj  N . Let 
A, 
B and

E denote the set of channels Alice, Bob and Eve access or jam. 
A is a Mt set, 
B is a
Mr set and 
E is a Mj set. Let p
t
i denote
P

A
i2
A
pt
A , p
r
i denote
P

B
i2
B
pr
B and p
j
i denoteP

E
i2
E
pj
E . And without loss of generality, we can assume Mt Mr. Figure 8.1 shows an
example of multiple access multiple jamming case with Mt = 2, Mr = 2 and Mj = 2.
The Nash equilibrium is given at the beginning of this chapter, and the proof is given
in Section 8.1. In the end, some remarks about this case are given in Section 8.2.
Lemma 8.0.7. The Nash equilirium in this case is given under three dierent conditions:
1. Case 1:
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Figure 8.1: Example of multiple access multiple jamming case.
If N   k + 1 > Mt,
pti

=
Mtp
RiPN
l=k
1p
Rl
; (8.1)
pri
 =
Mrp
RiPN
l=k
1p
Rl
; (8.2)
pji

= 1 
N k+1 Mj
RiPN
l=k
1
Rl
; (8.3)
for k  i  N , where k = min

kjRk > N k+1 MjPN
i=k
1
Ri

, and
pti

= pri
 = pji

= 0; 8i < k: (8.4)
2. Case 2:
If Mt  N   k + 1 > Mr,
pti

= 1; (8.5)
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for N  Mt + 1  i  N ,
pri
 =
Mrp
RiPN
l=k
1p
Rl
; (8.6)
pji

= 1 
N k+1 Mj
RiPN
l=k
1
Rl
; (8.7)
for k  i  N ,
where k = min

kjRk > N k+1 MjPN
i=k
1
Ri

, and
pri
 = 0; 8i < N  Mt + 1; (8.8)
pri
 = pji

= 0; 8i < k: (8.9)
3. Case 3:
If N   k + 1 Mr,
pti

=
Mtp
RiPN
l=kt
1p
Rl
; kt  i  N
pri
 =
Mrp
RiPN
l=kt
1p
Rl
; kt  i  N
pji

= 1 
N k+1 Mj
RiPN
l=k
1
Rl
; k  i  N
where k = min

kjRk > N k+1 MjPN
i=k
1
Ri

, kt = max
(
kj
Mtp
RkPN
i=k
1p
Ri
 1
)
.
Figure 8.2, Figure 8.3 and Figure 8.4 illustrate the three cases respectively, and notice
the brackets denote the number of channels one can access or jam, not the strategy. From
the gures, we can see that case 1 is the case Alice and Bob cannot access all the channels
from k to N , case 2 is the case only one of Alice and Bob can access all the channels from
k to N , and case 3 is the case both Alice and Bob can access all the channels from k to
N .
 Figure 8.5 shows the channel capacity.
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Figure 8.2: Illustration of case 1 in multiple access multiple jamming case.
Figure 8.3: Illustration of case 2 in multiple access multiple jamming case.
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Figure 8.4: Illustration of case 3 in multiple access multiple jamming case.
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Figure 8.5: Channel Quality (N = 15, k = 12).
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Figure 8.6: Case 1: P t

(= P r) (N = 15, k = 12).
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Figure 8.7: Case 1: P j

(N = 15, k = 12).
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Figure 8.8: Case 2: P t

(N = 15, k = 12).
 Figure 8.6 and Figure 8.7 give an example to illustrate case 1 with Mt =Mr = 2 and
Mj = 2. Figure 8.6 shows the strategy of Alice and Bob, we can see that Alice and
Bob only access channels from k to N , and when the channel quality is better, Alice
and Bob access this channel with a smaller probability. Figure 8.7 shows the strategy
of Eve, we can see that Eve only jams channels from k to N , and when the channel
quality is better Eve jams this channel with a larger probability.
 Figure 8.8, Figure 8.9 and Figure 8.10 give an example to illustrate case 2 withMt = 6,
Mr = 2 and Mj = 2. Figure 8.8 shows the strategy of Alice, we can see that Alice
takes constant strategy. Figure 8.9 shows the strategy of Bob, we can see that Bob
only access channels from k to N , and when the channel quality is better, Bob access
this channel with a smaller probability. Figure 8.10 shows the strategy of Eve, we can
see that Eve only jams channels from k to N , and when the channel quality is better
Eve jams this channel with a larger probability.
 Figure 8.11, Figure 8.12 and Figure 8.13 give an example to illustrate case 2 with
Mt = 6, Mr = 5 and Mj = 2. Figure 8.11 and Figure 8.12 shows the strategy of Alice
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Figure 8.9: Case 2: P r (N = 15, k = 12).
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Figure 8.10: Case 2: P j

(N = 15, k = 12).
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Figure 8.11: Case 3: P t

(N = 15, k = 12).
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Figure 8.12: Case 3: P r (N = 15, k = 12).
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Figure 8.13: Case 3: P j

(N = 15, k = 12).
and Bob, we can see that both Alice and Bob take constant strategy. Figure 8.13
shows the strategy of Eve, we can see that Eve only jams channels from k to N , and
when the channel quality is better Eve jams this channel with a larger probability.
8.1 Proof
Proof. The organization of proof is the same as Chapter 7.
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The reward of Alice and Bob access channel i is:
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where C0 is a constant independent of i. So we have
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where j is a channel index dierent from i.
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where C4 is a constant independent of i. And we can rewrite it as
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So far we have
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where C1 and C4 are constant independent of i.
From the discussion in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, we can give the result same as the
lemma.
8.2 Remark
Remark 8.2.1. Under the Nash equilibrium in this case, Alice, Bob and Eve do not always
operate on the same set of channels.
Remark 8.2.2. k is a variable that is for Alice, Bob and Eve to decide on which channels
they should take actions. Figure 8.14 shows k separates \good" channels and \bad" chan-
nels. Alice, Bob and Eve have no motivation to access or jam channels from 1 to k   1.
But in Case 2 and Case 3, Alice and Bob have to access channels from 1 to k   1.
Remark 8.2.3. k is determined by the channel capacity and Mj, and it is not related to
Alice and Bob.
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Figure 8.14: k separates \good" channels and \bad" channels.
Remark 8.2.4. When the channel quality is better, Eve jams this channel with a larger
probability while Alice and Bob access this channel with a smaller probability.
Remark 8.2.5. It is simple to verify that N  k+1 Mj+1. This implies that Alice and
Bob will access at least Mj + 1 channels. Otherwise, if they can access only Mj channels,
this channel will be jammed by the attacker with probability 1.
Remark 8.2.6. The Nash equilibrium of Alice, Bob and Eve is given in the form of marginal
distribution.
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Chapter 9
Numerical Simulation
In this chapter, we show the numerical simulation results of the Nash equilibrium. In our
simulation, the channel quality is independently generated by the same probability density
function, we choose exponential distribution. Ri  exp(100), where i = 1; 2; :::; N .
9.1 Equal Channel Quality Case
In this section, we show how the average data rate is aected by the total number of
channels. From Figure 9.1, we can see that the average data is maximized when N = 2.
This is because when N becomes larger, the total probability 1 need to be spread among
more channels, it becomes harder for Alice and Bob to be in the same channel. We have to
keep N  2 because this is needed to avoid being jammed with probability 1.
9.2 General Channel Quality Case
First we set N = 10 and E(Ri) = 100 to make numerical analysis about R. So Ri are
i.i.d. From R = N k

(
PN
l=k
1p
Rl
)2
, we can see that this is an order statistic problem. In this
problem, R depends on another random variable k, which also depends on the distribution
of R. The involvement of k makes the theoretical analysis complex. The following analysis
here is numerical and we show that for a not so large N the distribution of R can be
approximated by Gamma distribution. Each simulation runs 105 times.
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Figure 9.1: Average data rate vs. Total number of channels.
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Figure 9.2: Distribution of R, N = 10.
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Figure 9.3: Distribution of R, N = 1000.
From Figure 9.2, we can see the distribution of R can be approximated by Gamma
distribution when N = 10.
We set N to N = 1000. From Figure 9.3 we can see the approximation of Gamma
distribution is not as good as N = 10 but it is still acceptable.
9.3 One Access Multiple Jamming Case
In this numerical examples, we illustrate the case of one access multiple jamming case.
We set the total number of channels to N = 100. The data we use in this and next section
are the same set of R. In this case, Eve has innite numbers of the Nash equilibrium,
but they all achieve the same performance, so we just choose one solution which assumes
jamming each of the channels are all independent. From Figure 9.4, we can see that with the
number of channels Eve can jam increasing, the average throughput is decreasing. Notice
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Figure 9.4: R aected by Mj .
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Figure 9.5: R aected by Mt.
that Eve can increase her reward by jamming more channels, but if the number of channels
is already larger than a threshold, for example Mj > 20 in our simulation, her eort may
not worth the money to buy a more powerful device. This is because the channel becomes
very bad when their rank in the whole channels becomes low.
9.4 Multiple Access One Jamming Case
The simulation result shows that with the number of channels Alice and Bob can access
increased, the average throughput is increased. N = 100 in this section.
From Figure 9.5, we can see the curve is not so steep as the performance of multiple
jamming. But we can still see that if the number of channels is already larger than a
threshold, their reward increased per channel becomes small due to the channel becomes
worse with channel index decreases. If we increase M from 1 to 20, R is increased by more
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Figure 9.6: R aected by Mt under dierent Mj .
than 2000, but if we increase M from 80 to 100, R is increased by about 1400.
9.5 Multiple Access Multiple Jamming Case
Multiple access multiple jamming case is similar to the multiple access one jamming
case in nature. The dierence is that in this case Eve can jam two or more channels. What
we concern is just the average data rate of Alice and Bob, so we investigate this by setting
dierent values of Mj .
From Figure 9.6, we can see that withMj increasing, the average data rate is decreasing,
this is similar to one access multiple jamming case.
Figure 9.7 shows that with Mt(= Mr) increasing, the average data rate is increasing,
this is similar to multiple access one jamming case.
Now we investigate the \waste case" by setting M =Mt  Mr. In multiple access case,
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Figure 9.7: R aected by Mj under dierent Mt(=Mr).
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Figure 9.8: R aected by M under dierent M =Mt  Mr, Mr = 2.
when Alice can access more channel than Bob, Alice will have the chance to waste energy
as analyzed before. We can call this case \waste case".
In Figure 9.8, we can see if Mt and Mr is large enough, the performance of dierent M
is the same, so there is no motivation to use a large M due to the concern of power and
device cost.
In Figure 9.9, we compare the performance under the Nash equilibrium in our model and
the performance in learning based approach. We use the algorithm proposed in [6]. We can
see that our strategy performs better in two aspects: First, throughput of our strategy is
higher, because in the learning based algorithm, the authors always leave some probability
for \bad" channels; Second, our strategy do not need time to reach the maximum.
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Figure 9.9: R under the Nash equilibrium in our model and learning based approach.
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Chapter 10
Conclusion
The uncoordinated frequency hopping has been modeled as a zero-sum game between
the legitimate users and the attack. In the general channel quality case, we have obtained
the unique Nash equilibrium. For the case when the legitimate users or the attacker can
access or jam more than one channels, following similar steps in general channel quality
case, we have obtained the Nash equilibrium. In general, for better channels, it is more
probable for Eve to jam, while it is less probable for Alice and Bob to access. But there are
also some channel are not good enough so that none of Alice, Bob or Eve will access or jam
these channels. To determine which channels to access or jam, k is an important variable
to separate good channels and bad channels.
Using numerical simulation, we have shown the performance of UFH under the Nash
equilibrium. In general, if Alice and Bob have the ability to access more channels, the
average data rate will become larger, while if Eve has the ability to jam more channels, the
average data rate will become smaller. However, there is a special case called \waste case"
which needs more attention. In the \waste case", Alice is wasting power to access some
channels that is never accessed by Bob. And we also show that our strategy outperforms
the learning based strategy.
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